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A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
This piece' is purely and simply pedagogical. It is designed to help
law students (and other students of law); it is designed to help them
see the similarities between the various methods courts use to analyze
negligence. If lawyers, judges, or others get some benefit out of my
discussion I am pleased, but I dedicate this piece to those of you who
are trying to discern some meaningful pattern in the cases you are
studying in your first Torts course.
Negligence is a simple word; it is a simple word to describe a simple
concept-the failure to exercise reasonable care. However, it is between
the articulation of the concept and the resolution of concrete cases that
complexities arise. These problems are made more troublesome, and
more difficult, by the various ways in which courts analyze negligence.
Where no statute is involved some courts employ what I will call a
"proximate cause" analysis. Others use the duty-risk method. Still others
employ an algebraic formula known as Learned Hand's negligence for-
mula. Where there is a statute that proscribes the defendant's conduct,
courts will often use that statute to establish the appropriate standard
of care, and by doing so will employ what may appear to be yet another
analytical approach to negligence.
The first-year law student, with all these different decisional models,
may feel confused. She may wonder when to use what approach. She
may be confused by the facially different "elements" each pattern
presents.
Herein, I hope to show you that each of the approaches basically
deals with the same issues. The same questions are being addressed by
each approach even though one approach may articulate an element
differently than another. One important difference between the ap-
proaches is who gets to decide what under each. I will endeavor in the
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next few pages to do several things: (1) set forth the "elements" of
negligence under each approach; (2) identify who decides which element
under each approach; and (3) show the reader that what underlies each
approach is really one, single, unified "pattern" for deciding a negligence
case,
II. THE NEGLIGENCE "TESTS"
They tell me there is more than one way to skin a cat (I have never
tried it nor have any desire to try it). Likewise, there is more than one
way to analyze negligence. For present purposes, there are three com-
monly accepted negligence "formulas" or patterns. A fourth may be
subsumed within any of the other three; or, it may stand on its own.
These "formulas" are: (1) the standard common law proximate cause
approach, (2) violation of statute, (3) duty-risk, and (4) the Learned
Hand negligence formula. Let me begin with the traditional approach.
A. The Traditional Negligence Formula
There are four elements to negligence: duty, breach, a causal re-
lationship between the defendent's alleged negligent (careless) act and
the plaintiff's injuries, and damages. 2 The causal relation is actually
made up of two subelements: cause-in-fact and proximate (or legal)
cause.3 Some refer to both of these subelements together as proximate
cause, a tendency which has no doubt added to the confusion sur-
rounding the term.4 However, I shall refer to proximate cause as the
second part of the causal relationship requirement. For clarity's sake I
will break the "cause" element down into two separate elements. Thus
in order to recover in negligence, under this "proximate cause" approach,







The hornbooks tell us that duty is a question for the court, at least
usually.' The duty we are talking about here is a duty to exercise
2. See William L. Prosser et al., Cases and Materials on Torts 136 (8th ed. 1988)
[hereinafter Prosser et al.].
3. Id.
4. See id. Indeed this tendency was one of the reasons for the development of duty-
risk.
5. Cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 NE. 99 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928).
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reasonable care under the circumstances. For present purposes, suffice
it to say that a court may decide there is no duty owed in a certain
situation for various reasons. One common reason about which I have
previously written6 is administrative convenience. Courts will deny re-
covery to a whole class of plaintiffs whenever there is a fear that recovery
would burden the courts with countless hard to decide cases. This concern
Was at the heart of rules that limited recovery for emotional distress.,
Likewise, courts refused recovery for wrongful birth or wrongful life
because of problems with valuing life (versus non-life).8 Most courts
still continue to deny recovery for negligently inflicted economic loss
absent physical injury or property damage.9
So these are some of the situations where courts would, or did, not
impose a duty.10 When will a court impose a duty? One old saw provides
that a court will impose a duty whenever the risks with which a defendant
is presented are sufficiently grave to force a reasonable person to exercise
reasonable care to avoid those risks." That is, a person has a duty to
protect another whenever the risk to the other was sufficiently foreseeable
that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise ordinary care to
avoid that risk. 2 But is this a question for the court or for the jury?
In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., I" Judge Cardozo indicated that
it was a question for the court unless reasonable minds could disagree. '4
Other courts routinely treat duty purely as a question for the court.
Still others just generally state that they recognize a duty to exercise
reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risks and leave the hard questions
to the jury as matters of breach or proximate cause. This is basically
what Judge Andrews said should be done in his Palsgraf dissent.
6. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of
Punitive Damages, 51 La. L. Rev. 3 (1990).
7. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 359-60 (5th
Ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton on Torts]. For Louisiana's current treatment of
at least part of this difficult subject, see La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6; Lejeune v. Rayne
Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990).
8. Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).
9. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1984).
10. The authors of one casebook on torts posit that the duty element is particularly
relevant where there is a categorical rule excluding liability as to whole classes of plaintiffs
on claims. David W. Robertson et al., Cases and Materials on Torts 163 (1989). See also
Donoca v. Curry County, 734 P.2d 1339, 1340 (Or. 1987).
II. Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra note 7, at 169.
12. Id. at 280. Of course this all assumes that the defendant had a duty to act
because if he doesn't there can be no negligence in the first place. Prosser et al., supra
note 2, at 409. Bishop v. City of Chicago, 257 N.E. 2d 152 (11. Ct. App. 1970).





What about breach? Well, breach is where we supposedly decide
whether the defendant exercised the degree of care that a reasonable
person acting under the same or similar circumstances would have ex-
ercised. Who decides breach? This is a question for the jury, not for
the judge. But hold it; the breach question sounds a whole lot like the
duty question asked in the last paragraph and there we said the judge
got to decide. Who knows? Perhaps we might say that once the judge
decides there is a duty then and only then does the jury get to decide
for itself whether that duty has been breached.
3. Cause-In-Fact
Next is cause-in-fact and this too is supposedly a question for the
jury. The jury must decide whether the defendant's particular negligent
act was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries. 5
In about ninety-nine percent of the cases, the question is whether one
can say "but for" the defendant's negligence the plaintiff's injuries
would not have happened.' 6 Here one decides whether the defendant's
act was a necessary condition for the plaintiff's injuries.
Please note the counter-factual' 7 nature of the inquiry. It requires
jurors to answer a hypothetical question: what would have happened if
what did happen hadn't happened? If what happened would have hap-
pened even if what defendant did didn't happen then there's no cause-
in-fact. Now, bear in mind this is supposed to be the easy cause question.
In certain classes of cases even where one cannot say "but for"
the defendant's negligence the accident would not have happened, the
courts still find cause-in-fact. They say that the defendant's actions were
a "substantial factor" in causing plaintiff's injuries." Or, they resort
to a redefinition of injury, as in the "lost chance of survival" cases. 9
Or, they employ a fiction like concerted action, 20 shifting the burden
of proof on cause-in-fact 2 ' or market share liability.2 2 All of these
15. Leon Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause 132-44 (1927) [hereinafter Green,
Proximate Cause].
16. Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra note 7, at 266; Prosser et al., supra note 2,
at 265.
17. See Douglas N. Husak, Omissions, Causation, and Liability, 30 Phil. Q. 318,
323 (1980). See also Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability 15 (1980).
18. Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans Ry. Co., 243 La. 829, 147 So. 2d 646 (1962).
19. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Co-op, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (en
banc).
20. Hill v. Edmonds, 270 N.Y.S. 2d 1020 (1966).
21. Prosser et al., supra note 2, at 280.
22. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 912, 101 S. Ct. 285 (1980).
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deviations from the "but for" test are based in policy, even though we
continue to pretend that the counter factual cause-in-fact question is
purely a question of "scientific" fact.23
4. Proximate Cause
After cause-in-fact comes proximate cause, or legal cause as the
Restatement (Second) of Torts 24 (and now Louisiana25 ) calls it. What is
proximate cause? Well it is really a way of deciding whether society
ought to hold this defendant, whose negligent acts were a cause-in-fact
of the plaintiff's damages, liable under these circumstances, to this
plaintiff. Should the court sever the chain of causation or should it
hold the defendant liable? As scholars have long pointed out, proximate
cause is really a question of policy. 6 However, in most states, the task
of deciding whether the defendant's negligence is a proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries is entrusted to the jury. 27 How does a jury decide
such a thing?
Most courts tell juries they must decide whether the plaintiff's in-
juries were foreseeable, 2 direct, 29 natural, or probable,30 in light of the
defendant's conduct. If so, then the defendant's conduct proximately
caused plaintiff's injuries. If, alternatively, the injuries were remote" or
unforeseeable,3 2 there would be no proximate cause. We could go on
about these "magic words." Courts use them both alone and in com-
bination. The important point, for now at least, is that the hornbook
says proximate cause is a question for the jury.3 3 As such, one would
expect a court to review a jury decision on proximate cause much as
it would review any jury determination, with great discretion accorded
the fact-finder. However, this is not always the case as appellate courts
frequently seize the proximate cause question on appeal and treat it as
23. See, e.g., Josepl- W. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning "Legal Cause" at
Common Law, 9 Colum. L. Rev. 16, 23 (1909).
24. Restatement (Second), Torts § 430 (1965).
25. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 137 So. 2d 298 (La.
1962).
26. Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 15, at 68; Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra
note 7, at 273.
27. See S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (2d ed. 1981).
Cf. Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the
Present Darkness, 69 Wash. U. L.Q. 49, 62 (1991).
28. Kelley, supra note 27, at 52.
29. Id. at 51.
30. Id. at 68.
31. Id. at 66.
32. Id. at 75.
33. Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra note 7, at 319.
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if it were a question of law,3 4 to be more freely reviewed and reversed.
This tendency created some ambiguity at common law regarding just
what proximate cause meant. Still more confusion is created by com-
peting cases within the same jurisdiction dealing with the issue. For
years the thin skull rule, which provides that you take your plaintiff
as you find him, 35 has existed side by side with narrower rules for other
cases. Moreover, some courts, such as the one deciding In re Polemis, 36
hold a defendant liable for all damages which he directly caused. Others,
such as the Wagon Mound P7 court, limit liability to those damages
which are foreseeable beforehand. Still others, following the Restatement
(Second) of Torts"8 use the word foreseeable but apply it in a hindsight
manner, as Justice Andrews did in his Palsgraf dissent.
Adding confusion onto confusion, it is also at the proximate cause
level that the jury, or judge (as factfinder), must deal with such intri-
guingly vague concepts as intervening causes,39 i.e. is the intervening
cause superseding, in which case the defendant is relieved from liability,
or merely intervening, in which case what the defendant did is deemed
to be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries? 4° Such questions are
generally not susceptable to purely rational responses.
5. Damages
Lastly is the question of damages. What is the "value" of the
injuries that the plaintiff has suffered and that the law allows her to
recover? This is always a question for the fact-finder, unless of course,
reasonable minds could not disagree. Naturally there may also be ques-
tions as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the type of damages
sought. For instance, can a bystander who witnesses a close relative's
serious physical injury recover for the ensuing mental distress in the
absence of personal injury or property damage? 41 To me that is more
a question of duty-or proximate cause42 -than damages.
Wrapping up, in a traditional negligence case the allocation of
decision-making responsibility looks like this:
34. Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 15, at 76. Kelly, supra note 27, at 89. See
also Leon Green, Judge & Jury 380 (1930) [hereinafter Green, Judge and Jury].
35. Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 481 N.Y.S. 2d 545 (1984).
36. Court of Appeal, [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
37. Privy Council, 1961 [19611 A.C. 388.
38. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435 (1965).
39. Prosser et al., supra note 2, at 316.
40. Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1981).
41. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 2315.6.







Proximate or legal cause Jury
Damages Jury
B. Violation of Statute
Thus, we have the standard negligence formulation. Naturally in a
jurisdiction which follows this pattern or definition of negligence, it will
sometimes happen that a tort defendant has violated a statute, usually
a criminal statute. The plaintiff may ask the court to accept that statute
as the appropriate standard of care in her tort case. That is, the plaintiff
may claim that the violation of the statute constituted negligence because
reasonable people do not break the law. In such a case, the negligence
formula is slightly varied.
1. Elements
In deciding whether to adopt the statute as the standard of care of
a reasonable person, the court asks itself two questions. First, is the
plaintiff within the class of persons the legislature enacted the statute
to protect? Second, is the risk that occurred within the class of risks
the statute was designed to guard against? If the court answers both
of these questions "yes" then the court accepts the statute as the standard
of care of the reasonable person for purposes of the case before it. 41
Actually this sentence may or may not be true depending upon the
procedural effect that the jurisdiction accords to violation of a statute
in a negligence case.4 4 I'll return to that point in a moment.
Just because the statute establishes the standard of care of the
reasonable person does not mean that the plaintiff has won her case.
She must still establish all the other elements of negligence. That is,
the plaintiff must still prove that the defendant violated the statute, that
the violation of the statute was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries
and that the plaintiff was, in fact, damaged. The astute reader will note
that I have essentially equated the two questions concerning the class
of persons and the scope of risks with the traditional formula's duty
and proximate cause elements. Thus, let me chart the violation of statute
approach and the traditional negligence formula side-by-side:
43. Prosser et al., supra note 2, at 209, 213; Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra
note 7, at 220.
44. Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 1976).
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Traditional Formula Violation of Statute
Duty Question 1 (Class of persons)
Breach Violation
Cause-in-fact Cause-in-fact
Proximate cause Question 2 (Scope of risks)
Damages Damages
a. Cause-In-Fact and Licenses
Several points now merit explicit attention. First, let me turn to
cause-in-fact. It seems obvious that the plaintiff must establish that the
violation of the statute was the cause-in-fact of her injuries; however,
I fear this fact is sometimes down played. A good example of this arises
in licensing cases. In a good many cases plaintiffs attempt to employ
a licensing statute to establish the standard of care of the reasonable
person or the reasonable professional. Imagine a case where a plaintiff
claims that it is negligence to practice medicine without a license and
therefore an unlicensed practitioner is liable for injuries resulting from
medical treatment.45 Or, the plaintiff in another case claims that the
defendent is negligent for driving a car without an operator's license in
violation of a statute.4 Courts wrestle with these problems.
I find one rather simple solution47 is to ask whether the lack of the
license was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries. Can one say but
for the lack of the license the injury would not have occurred? There
are several Louisiana cases that have apparently adopted this approach
with respect to unlicensed drivers thereby supporting my point, if not
undermining my originality.48 It seems the answer to the question is
usually no. An injury can occur even when a doctor, or a driver, has
a license. One might argue that the jury ought to decide the cause-in-
fact issue; however, the difficulty of answering the cause-in-fact question,
if the statute is adopted as the standard of care, coupled with the
violation's potential prejudicial effect, may serve as a reason for the
45. See Brown v. Shyne, 151 N.E. 197 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976).
46. 88 Fuller v. Sirois, 82 A.2d 82 (N.H. 1951). Prosser et al., supra note 2, at 222.
47. A court could also find that a particular licensing statute is meant to protect
against the risk that one will be injured by an improperly trained, negligent actor but
not meant to protect one injured by a properly trained, non-negligent, but unlicensed
actor. As such the crux of the case is whether the actor was negligent, not whether he
had a license. For a recent Louisiana case applying a driver's license statute as the standard
of care of the reasonable person, see Chatman v. Turner, No. 91-0782 (La. App. 1st
Cir. June 29, 1992).
48. Loveday v. Traveler Ins. Co., 585 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
590 So. 2d 65 (1991); see also Armour v. Armour, 541 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 546 So. 2d 1217 (1989).
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court to refuse to accept the statute as the standard of care.4 9 Perhaps,
these factors may even justify excluding the fact of the violation from
the case because it is unduly prejudicial given its slight probative value.5 0
Alternatively, one could say that reasonable minds could not disagree
on the cause-in-fact question. The real issue is whether the driver did
fail to exercise due care, whether licensed or not. It is on this issue
that these cases are usually litigated.
b. Duty and Proximate Cause
Turning from cause-in-fact to duty and proximate cause, one will
note from the "elements" chart that question 1 takes the place of duty
and question 2 takes the place of proximate cause. This "substitution"
points out that the violation of a statute approach to negligence is
remarkably similar to the traditional formula. What differences are there?
This gets us to the question of who decides.
Normally, one would think it is the judge who decides whether to
adopt the statute as the standard of care of the reasonable person under
the circumstances. That is, it should be the judge who answers questions
I and 2. That statement is not a radical one. Most would probably
accept it and put it in their hornbooks.5 ' Thus we see an apparent
difference between the traditional and the violation of statute approaches.
This is so because if question 2 equates with proximate cause, as I have
postulated, then the judge, in deciding whether the risk is within the
scope of the statute's reach, is deciding proximate cause. Under the
traditional approach, it is the jury who decides whether the defendant's
negligence is a proximate, or legal, cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
We could argue it is sensible to have judges make this scope of
statute decision because it is appropriate for judges, rather than juries,
to interpret the scope of statutes. The scope of the statute is a question
of legislative intent, purpose, and policy which a judge is well suited
to analyze and answer. But, if proximate cause, in garden variety neg-
ligence cases, is a question of policy, why don't judges get to decide
proximate cause too? I am sorry to distract you with that question but
I couldn't resist. 2 Let me now reproduce my elements chart adding a
column for who decides.
49. Stachnewiz v. Mar'Cam Corp., 488 P.2d 436 (Or. 1971).
50. La. Code Evid. art. 403, Fed. R. Evid. art. 403.
51. Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra note 7, at 222; Prosser et al., supra note 2,
at 213.
52. For an illuminating discussion of violation of statute, see David P. Leonard, The
Application of Criminal Legislation to Negligence Cases: A Reexamination, 23 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 427 (1983).
151719931
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Traditional Who decides Violation of statute
Duty Judge/Judge Question 1
Breach Jury/Jury Violation
Cause-in-fact Jury/Jury Cause-in-fact
Proximate cause Jury/Judge Question 2
Damages Jury/Jury Damages
To summarize the point I'm trying to make, violation of statute looks
a whole lot like plain old negligence except that the judge, not the jury,
gets to decide the equivalent of the proximate cause question. I've
highlighted this difference in the chart. Now, if I may, let me debunk
a little of this apparent difference.
First, some courts, in violation of statute cases, still ask the jury
whether the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. Whoa Jim! How can that be if question 2 equates
with proximate cause?53 That's a good question. It is almost as if the
trial judge, in giving the jury the proximate cause issue in a violation
of statute case, is saying: "Yeah, okay, this risk might be within the
scope of the statute but I'd really like to ask the jury to make that
decision." Is it abdication of authority to ask the jury to make that
decision? Or, is there something about the risk that occurred that makes
it appropriate to get the common sense view of the community? However
you explain or ask it, the effect is obvious. Asking the jury to decide
the proximate cause question in a violation of statute case accentuates
the similarities, not the differences, between the violation of statute
approach and the traditional formulation.
Second, who really gets to decide proximate cause, duty, and even
breach, in a violation of statute case, depends upon what procedural
effect the relevant jurisdiction accords a finding of violation of statute
in a negligence case.
2. Procedural Effect of Violation in a Negligence Case
Generally there are three possible procedural effects of the violation
of a statute in negligence cases: "negligence per se," "presumption of
negligence," or "some evidence" of negligence.54
a. Negligence Per Se
In a "negligence per se" jurisdiction if the court answers questions
1 and 2 in the plaintiff's favor, the standard of care (part of the breach
question), duty, and proximate cause issues are resolved against the
53. Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra note 7, at 223.
54. Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W. 2d 270, 276-83 (Mich. 1976).
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defendant. Assuming that the defendant violated the statute and the
violation was a cause-in-fact of some injury to the plaintiff, the defen-
dant's only out is to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the violation was excused." The mere fact that the defendant was
exercising due care in violating the statute is irrelevant unless that due
care rises to the level of an excuse.5 6 In such a jurisdiction, excuse is
typically narrower than the generalized concept of ordinary care.
Note, under a "negligence per se" regime, the jury's role is rather
limited. It decides whether there has been a violation; it decides cause-
in-fact; and, it decides the amount of damages. The court decides the
duty question, as usual, and it decides the proximate cause question.
Of course, the jury gets to decide if the defendant is excused under the
facts; however, it does not seem that the jury gets to decide what
constitutes an excuse. That decision is left to the court. In short, the
jury's role, in a paradigm "negligence per se" jurisdiction, is that of
fact-finder. It does not bring its views, the common sense of the com-
munity, to bear on the policy aspects of the case. Policy, I suppose,
is left to the judge in his, or her, guise as statutory interpreter.
One perceives another critical difference between a court deciding
a negligence case in a strict "negligence per se" jurisdiction, under the
violation of statute approach, and a court using the traditional approach.
Traditionally, it is up to the jury to decide whether the defendant
exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. That is, the jury, in
essence, sets the standard of care for the case before it.
Certainly the jurors have some guidelines: the reasonable person,
the reasonable person who is blind, the reasonable professional, etc.
But applying these general guidelines to the case is the jury's job. It is
part of the breach question, the big part. However, when a court adopts
a statute as the standard of care in a "negligence per se" jurisdiction,
it decides what the standard of care is and the jury, while it does decide
whether there was a violation of the statute, does not get to decide
whether the fact of violation constitutes a breach of the otherwise
appropriate standard of the reasonable person under the circumstances.
Functionally speaking, the jury has less to do in a "negligence per se"
case than in a traditional negligence case, not only because it does not
get to decide the proximate cause issue but, just as significantly, because
it has no real role to play in deciding whether the conduct was negligent
to begin with.
55. Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1920).
56. Of course there are some statutes the violation of which constitutes negligence
whether the violation might otherwise be excused or not. See Prosser et al., supra note
2, at 234-35. These are cases where the statutory duty is so important, from a policy
perspective, that one is almost absolutely liable for their violation.
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b. Presumption of Negligence
Moving now to a jurisdiction that treats the violation of a statute
in a negligence case as a "presumption of negligence," one notes some
subtle differences. The court still decides questions 1 and 2: scope of
the statute concerning the class of plaintiffs protected and the risks
covered. The jury still decides violation, cause-in-fact, and damages. So,
if we want to be rigid about all of this, the judge still decides the
proximate cause question in a "presumption of negligence" jurisdiction.
However, the jury's power is greater in a "presumption of negligence"
jurisdiction than it is in a "negligence per se" jurisdiction. That enhanced
power arises in the determination of the standard of care; it results
from the very difference between violation of statute as a "presumption
of negligence" and violation of statute as "negligence per se." In a
"presumption" jurisdiction, the defendant, after the court has decided
questions 1 and 2 against him, can still prevail on the standard of care
question if he establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he
was exercising due care, despite the violation. Thus the jury still gets
to decide what the standard of care is, as in a traditional negligence
case. However, in a traditional negligence case the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving a breach of the standard of care; here, the burden
of proving compliance with the standard of care is on the defendant.
No doubt, the statute continues to hang over the defendant's head like
the sword of Damocles.17 He must prove that, even though he violated
the statute, he was acting reasonably under the circumstances. However,
this is an out the defendent does not have in a "negligence per se"
jurisdiction.
c. Some Evidence
Lastly, in a jurisdiction where violation of a statute is "some ev-
idence" of negligence, the jury has even more power. In such a juris-
diction, the jury may or may not adopt the statute as the appropriate
standard of care. The burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff
throughout. In essence, the jury gets to decide the standard of care
question-the traditional negligence question-as well as the proximate
cause question (question 2). Presumably, the court must make a pre-
liminary decision on questions 1 and 2 before allowing the jury to
57. Interestingly a statute logically could have another effect. The violation of a
statute could merely place the burden of going forward with evidence of due care on the
defendant. This would be consistent with saying that the statute creates a "presumption"
of negligence. In such a case the violation would force the defendant to go forward with
enough evidence of due care to avoid a directed verdict. If the defendant satisfied that
burden then the ultimate burden of persuasion on "negligence" would be on the plaintiff
and the violation would serve as some evidence of negligence.
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consider the statute as "some evidence" of negligence. OtherWise, the
statute would be irrelevant. However, the decision on question 2 (and
maybe even question 1) is not binding on the jury in any real sense of
the term. Moreover, the fact of violation does not establish breach of
the ordinary person's standard of care. Thus, the "some evidence"
approach is remarkably similar to the traditional approach in non-
violation of statute cases.
C. Duty-Risk
Moving from violation of statute to duty-risk, one notes some marked
similarities between the two approaches. This is quite natural since duty-
risk is derived, in part, from the violation of statute approach.s The
most dramatic difference is that duty-risk is applied much more broadly.
By definition, courts only employ the violation of statute approach when
there is a statute involved. Duty-risk is potentially applicable to any
and every negligence case.
1. Development and Promises
The complete development of the duty-risk approach is beyond the
scope of this paper;5 9 however, a short summary is helpful to its un-
derstanding. Duty-risk was the creation of the legal realists: most notably,
Dean Leon Green and Louisiana State University's own Professor Wex
Malone. 6' They responded to two principal problems with the traditional
negligence formula, both of which grew out of the phrase "proximate
cause." The first problem was that many courts used (and some continue
to use62 ) the words "proximate cause" to refer to both cause-in-fact
and legal limitation, or legal cause. 63 Expecting one horse to pull such
58. Prosser et al., supra note 2, at 339; Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 15, at
21, 28.
59. See, e.g., Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 15; Green, Judge and Jury, supra
note 34; Wex S. Malone, Essays on Torts (1986); Kelly, supra note 27.
60. See Kelly, supra note 27.
61. See David W. Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues
on Hill v. Lunden & Assoc., Inc., 34 La. L. Rev. 1 (1973).
62. See E. Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk Versus Proximate Cause and the
Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1, 15
(1977).
63. Ironically Prosser's casebook, Prosser et al., supra note 2, falls prey to this very
tendency. On page 136 the authors allude to proximate cause as referring to both cause-
in-fact and legal limitation. Then Chapter 5 is entitled "Cause In Fact" and Chapter 6,
which deals only with legal limitation, is entitled "Proximate Cause." Despite this minor
bit of confusion the book continues to be the most commonly used Torts casebook and
for good reason. However, can law professors complain too much if students have a
hard time grasping the concept of proximate cause?
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a heavy wagon, especially such a confusing one, was a whole lot to
ask. So much so that many juries were no doubt confused about what
they were being asked to do when the court instructed them on proximate
cause. As such, one of the real strengths of the duty-risk approach was
its separation of the cause-in-fact question from the legal limitation
question." Malone could not overemphasize this point.6 And, that sep-
aration is no mean feat. But the duty-risk approach promises even more.
One of the problems that had developed with the traditional neg-
ligence approach, and its reliance on the two words "proximate cause,"
was that judges could hide behind them." Proximate and cause, when
placed side-by-side, are two big words, much bigger than they are alone.
They are big enough in fact for lawyers, judges, even whole courts to
get behind and stay behind. According to Green 67 and Malone, 68 the
words obfuscated. You see, the great ones opined, proximate cause, or,
more accurately, legal limitation, is really a question of policy. It is a
question relating to the underlying purposes of tort law: compensation,
deterrence, risk spreading, maybe punishment, administrative conven-
ience, consistent development of the law (precedent), legislative will and
fairness or morality. It is a question relating to all the things a civilized
64. Green wrote:
Either we must recognize at least two kinds of "cause" meaning entirely different
things, as has already been developed by the courts, or else we must find some
way to relieve the term of this weighted meaning. It is thought that the analysis
here suggested does this and thereby makes clear the problems which are involved
so that they can be dealt with rationally.
Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 15, at 40; Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-
In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60 (1956) [hereinafter Malone, Cause-In-Fact].
65. See, e.g., Malone, Cause-In-Fact, supra note 64.
66. Green, Judge & Jury, supra note 34, at 223.
67. Id. at 225.
Though, it may be conceded that somehow or other the judicial process gets
an unbelievably large amount of its work done acceptably, there is no possibility
of its successfully meeting the exactions of hard cases until it is recognized that
the judge, in finding a basis for judgment, must go beyond and above any
range for which rules have yet been fashioned. This does not mean that the
individual judge cannot learn much from what other judges in other cases have
done and said, or that juries cannot be aided by intelligent instruction. These
may still be pressed; they are valuable means of educating judgment but that
is as much as they can do in these hard cases. Neither good administration nor
the progress of law at this point lies in authority of any sort. Legal science
needs rather the power to discern the factors at work in the particular case,
and the power to pass acceptable judgments for the time and place. These
powers are not developed except by their employment. They have been in large
part effectually blocked by so-called rules of causation, and thus, in addition
to being worthless, these rules are hurtful.
68. See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus Amer-
ican Beverage Company, 30 La. L. Rev. 363 (1970).
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society ought to consider in making decisions in difficult personal injury
cases.
And, if legal limitation is a question of policy, then shouldn't judges
talk about the policies that influence, or should influence, their decisions?
One would hope. And I believe the legal realists did realistically entertain
that hope. At least they thought judges should not rely on, or hide
behind, words like: direct, remote, foreseeable, unforeseeable, natural,
probable, expected, unexpected, intervening, superseding, and whatever
other magic mumbo jumbo courts could use to obfuscate the policies
that were really at the heart of their decisions.69
In this regard, duty-risk promised two more things. First, to the
extent that courts were not making policy decisions, but were taking
doctrine seriously and really trying to apply the magic words, duty-risk
revealed that policy, not linguistic and logical gymnastics, was critical.
Second, to the extent that courts were really basing decisions on policy,
rather than magic words, it encouraged them to explain those policy
decisions. Of course, this all raised another interesting question, one we
have already raised when looking at the other approaches to negligence:
who decides? Were courts wrong in letting the jury decide the proximate
cause (legal limitation) question? Was that part of their hiding?
Reading Green, one might conclude that the courts had erred in
submitting the proximate cause question to the jury. Noting the com-
plexity inherent in negligence cases and the confusion between the court's
and the jury's role, he opined:
Judges habitually fall into two grave errors in handling cases
of this nature. First, they do not recognize that they have a
function to perform by way of defining the limits of the rule
involved. Second, they place the burden on the jury under the
guise of determining "proximate cause." And the stupid part
of it all is that the attempt is made to use the "probability of
harm" formula, employed to determine negligence, also as a
test of this so-called "proximate cause" issue. Frequently a third
error is made. It happens in this way: If the result obtained
from erroneously leaving the fictitious "cause" issue to the jury
is palpably unjust, or if the result of leaving it to the jury
would probably be so, the appellate court declares as a matter
of law that there was in fact no causal relation issue to be left
to the jury, and proceeds to deal with it as an issue of causation
for the court. Here they make use of all those weighted phrases
such as "remote," "unforeseen," "intervening agencies," "in-
dependent agencies," and a score of others which are meaningless
69. Tiode, supra note 62, at 24-25.
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as solvents except they provide a smoke screen behind which
the court can retire from an awkward position. They do here
under the guise of determining "proximate cause" what should
have been done by way of defining the scope of protection
afforded by the rule invoked.
Cases are frequently left to a jury's determination which for
one reason or another are allowed to stand, when, if the trial
judge had exercised his proper function they would have been
determined differently. Here the judge abdicates his primary
function. 70
But, were these judges wrong in letting the jury decide, or, was it
only a question of craft, not allocation of decision-making responsibility?
Answering this question requires an analysis of duty-risk and how it is
different from the traditional negligence formula.
2. Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause
Proximate cause, question 2, and the risk part of duty-risk are aimed
at essentially the same thing. They are tools decision makers use to
hone the scope of the defendant's duty. That is, decision-makers use
these "questions" to decide whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a
duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid a certain risk of harm and to
decide whether the duty, if it exists at all, extends to protect against
the risk that materialized in the case before the court? Recall Cardozo's
phrase, if not his reasoning, from Palsgraf: "risk imports relation." 7'
Put another way, is the scope of the duty broad enough to extend to
cover this risk? My colleague, Professor Frank Maraist, has said it about
as well as anyone. He writes:
Every tort system must answer a fundamental question: assuming
that the defendant's conduct is proscribed (is an intentional tort
or negligent or is subject to strict or absolute liability), do we
nevertheless want to impose liability upon the defendant for
these damages, sustained by this plaintiff in this particular man-
ner? The answer is dictated by policy, sometimes fundamental
fairness and sometimes by a societal determination of whether
to deter or encourage certain conduct. Sometimes -the answer is
influenced by considerations of allocation of resources, such as
avoidance of a "floodgate of litigation." While the question is
uniform and the rationale underlying the answer is often clear,
70. Green, Proximate Cause, supra note 15, at 76-77 (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
71. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928).
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the name by which the question is described varies among the
American jurisdictions. 72
Another, whose writing predated Maraist's succinct eloquence, was Ma-
lone. He wrote, in what may be the most quoted paragraph in tort
law, certainly the most quoted in our state:
All rules of conduct, irrespective of whether they are the
product of a legislature or are part of the fabric of the court-
made law of negligence, exist for purposes. They are designed
to protect some persons under some circumstances against some
risks. Seldom does a rule protect every victim against every risk
that may befall him, merely because it is shown that the violation
of the rule played a part in producing the injury. The task of
defining the proper reach or thrust of a rule in its policy aspects
is one that must be undertaken by the court in each case as it
arises. How appropriate is the rule to the facts of this contro-
versy? This is a question that the court cannot escape. 7
Thus, put simply, the issue in a particular case is: does the duty go
this far? Alternatively, as Professor Crowe has so precisely put it: does
the defendant's duty extend to protect this plaintiff from this harm
which has occurred in this manner?74 So how does the duty-risk approach
handle this question? It collapses the common law's separation of duty
and proximate cause into essentially one question. As noted, it clearly
separates that question from the cause-in-fact question. When collapsed,
the question looks a lot like questions 1 and 2 in a violation of statute
case. To say it again, the duty-risk pattern asks: does this defendant
owe a duty to protect this plaintiff from this risk which occurred in
this manner?
Interestingly, there is yet another resemblance between the duty-risk
approach and the violation of statute approach. In a violation of statute
case, there is a "rule of conduct" for the court in the applicable statute.
In a duty-risk case, it is almost as if the court enacts its own statute.
It says: if we had a rule that said "thou shalt not do whatever it is
that the plaintiff has alleged the defendant did," would violation of
that rule extend to protect this plaintiff, and, therefore, justify recovery
in a negligence action? What role does the jury play here? The jury
may play some role, when deciding the breach question, in deciding
whether we ought to have such a rule. Or, the court may make that
72. Frank L. Maraist, Louisiana Torts Law: Cases and Materials 76-77 (1991). Mar-
aist's book is Volume II of the LSU Law Center's Louisiana Practice Series.
73. Malone, Cause-In-Fact, supra note 64, at 73.
74. Here I have paraphrased from Professor Crowe, William L. Crowe, Sr., The
Anatomy of a Tort, 22 Loy. L. Rev. 903, 906 (1976). Crowe, in turn, was relying upon
Green.
19931
6LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
decision alone, in which case the jury only gets to decide whether there
was a violation (as well as cause-in-fact and damages). If the jury gets
to decide whether we have such a rule, duty-risk resembles the "pre-
sumption of negligence" violation of statute approach. If the jury must
accept the court's rule, then it looks more like a "negligence per se"
violation of statute approach. This all reminds me of Oliver Wendell
Holmes' insistence that over time individual trial judges ought to start
deciding negligence (breach) as a matter of law, that is, by essentially
making rules. 7 But I won't dawdle over legal history, now.
Let me, for the sake of clarity and consistency, chart the elements
of the duty-risk approach in the same manner I have used for the other
two approaches. I will set forth the elements in the order the Louisiana
Supreme Court did in Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc. 76 Many other







Now, back to who decides. Who decides whether the duty extends
to protect this plaintiff from this injury which occurred in this manner?
Does the judge? To many scholars, like Green, the answer is yes. 71
Many Louisiana courts have apparently agreed. 79 If the answer is yes,
and the judge decides, then the allocation of decision-making respon-






75. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 98-99 (1881).
76. 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972).
77. See, e.g., Shelton v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406 (La. 1976);
Jones v. Robbins, 289 So. 2d 104 (La. 1974), for subsequent Louisiana Supreme Court
cases applying the duty-risk approach.
78. See, e.g., Crowe, supra note 74, and Thode, supra note 62.
79. Entrevia v Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983); Rue v. Dept. of Highways, 372
So. 2d 1197 (La. 1979); Boyer v Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1978); Laird v Travelers
Ins. Co., 267 So, 2d 714 (La. 1972); Hill v Lundin & Assoc. Inc., 256 So. 2d. 620 (La.
1972). See also Timothy J. McNamara, The Duties and Risks of the Duty-Risk Analysis,
44 La. L. Rev. 1227, 1250 (1984).
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So, the effect of duty-risk is to take the proximate cause question away
from the jury and give it to the judge. One might justifiably conclude
that there is some sense to this because the limitation question is a
policy question and judges may be better prepared than juries to make
such policy determinations. However, are such policy questions really
capable of explanation? Professor Robertson has noted that courts using
the duty-risk method do not always explain themselves. He states:
Maybe it is just a matter of tradition. Courts don't talk that
way, it is just not done. But, really, you must realize that often
there's not very much sensibly to be said about the ultimate
reason for a particular result-that it just seems more fair than
the opposite outcome may be about all there is to it.0
Well then if that is the case, if you just can't talk about it, what has
duty-risk done for us in this regard? Professor Robertson has said that
duty-risk is an "evocative" approach to solving negligence problems."1
I read evocative to mean evokes discussion; however, if, even under an
approach that is supposed to evoke discussion, courts don't talk about
why they decide as they do because one result just seems more fair
than the opposite outcome, what has this evocative approach evoked?
If a particular result just seems more fair than another, then perhaps
magic words like foreseeability, directness, remoteness, etc., are alright
to use. Maybe they're alright to hide behind. Even Green let the jury
hide behind them when deciding the negligence question, his third ques-
tion.
Maybe to say that someone proximately, or legally, caused an injury
to another is to connote something, not to denote it. Perhaps to say
that a person proximately, or legally, caused an injury is to suggest a
conclusion about a state of affairs that is in the nature of a metaphor.
The real reason cannot be explained. It can only be suggested; it can
only be hinted at. It can only be described in conclusory terms based
on our common notions of what is fair: of what common decency and
compassion demand.
Maybe the real reason for some decisions is as much a result of
perception, sensation, and feeling, as it is a result of thinking and logic.
But the law, at least as a craft, is logically oriented. It relies, in its
public face, on reason and logic. Duty-risk encourages that reasoning
and its exposition . 2 But is it realistic in that regard? Does it neglect
the visceral, unconscious aspect of the decision, an aspect that may be
critical in any case where the scope of the duty really is at issue? In
that regard, was proximate cause so bad in its appeal to what Justice
80. Robertson, supra note 61, at 12.
81. Id. at 1.
82. Robertson, supra note 61.
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Lemmon in Fowler v. Roberts" has called "ultimately visceral" '8 4 reac-
tions? I think not. Does forcing explanation force an underemphasis on
the types of emotional factors law has traditionally not expressed as
relevant. Certainly we don't read many tort decisions expressly articu-
lating things like compassion, sympathy, and empathy. But can anyone
doubt that these are at the heart of a lot of opinions in particular
cases? If forcing judges to explain themselves overplays the rational,
logical bases of decision, is it such a good thing?
I also think that if, in fact, proximate, or legal, cause decisions or
duty-risk decisions are essentially visceral decisions then perhaps it is
not undesirable to ask that juries, composed of members of the com-
munity in which the case arose, make those decisions. Maybe there are
issues which judges are better suited to decide. As noted in the intro-
ductory section of this paper, interpretation of statutes is one of these
areas. Moreover, some commentators have argued that juries are not
able to deal with difficult economic and technological concepts. Perhaps,
judges are better suited for some of these decisions as well. However,
where the primary issue before the court relates, essentially, to what is
fair, given the facts before the court, then perhaps the jury is the best
decision-maker. However, that is not to say it is not desirable to preserve
the flexibility courts now enjoy to decide those issues that are appropriate
for courts to decide and juries to decide those issues that are appropriate
for juries to decide.
We will not solve these problems here: assuming that the court does
make this scope of duty decision, then the duty-risk method is most
like the violation of statute approach where the effect of violation is
"negligence per se." As in a "negligence per se" jurisdiction, the jury
has, no role in deciding what the scope of the duty is. Of course, the
jury in a duty-risk jurisdiction may, unlike a jury in a "negligence per
se" case, play a role in defining the standard of care when deciding
the breach question. One may remain justifiably cynical concerning
whether judges do, or always should, decide the risk questions themselves
without asking the jury for help.
4. A Mid-Stream Summary
Let me now reassert a basic point. In each of the approaches
described so far we see the same essential elements. They differ with
respect to who decides what, which is illustrated by the chart of the
elements below with "who decides" in parentheses. The chart begins
with the traditional negligence formula and matches up the other ap-
83. 556 So. 2d 1 (La. 1989).
84. Id. at 5.
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Duty (Judge) QI (Judge*) Duty (Judge)
Breach (Jury) Violation (Jury) Breach (Jury)
CIF (Jury) CIF (Jury) CIF (Jury)
PC (Jury) Q2 (Judge*) Risk (Judge)
Damages (Jury) Damages (Jury) Damages (Jury)
*Of course the binding effect of the judge's decision on these
questions depends upon the procedural effect the jurisdiction
accords a violation of statute.
Thus one can see the interrelationship, of the three approaches. One
later arrival on the scene also merits our consideration: Learned Hand's
negligence formula.
D. The Learned Hand Formula
In a series of opinions written in the 1940s, Judge Learned Hand
distilled a negligence formula from the common law approach.8 The
law and economics movement has since adopted his formula as its own.8 6
The formula provides that one is negligent where the burden (B) of
avoiding a risk, or package of risks, is less than the probability of that
risk occurring (P) times the gravity or severity of the anticipated risk
should it arise (L). Put algebraically, as the great jurist himself put it,
one is negligent if B < P x L. It must be emphasized that B is not
merely the direct cost of avoidance, i.e., repairs to a defective car. It
also includes the loss society will suffer from risk avoidance, i.e., losses
society will suffer because an alternative product design makes it harder
to use. B also includes the costs to the defendant of discovering the
risk, i.e., the cost of finding out that the car is defective. 7
1. An Economic Approach to Negligence: The Invisible Hand?
The law and economics school has adopted the formula because it
is an economic statement of negligence. It is a definition of negligence
tied to the efficiency of accident avoidance. That is, an economist would
like to encourage people to invest in accident avoidance (B) up to the
85. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Conway
v. O'Brien, Ill F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940).
86. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 122-23 (2d ed. 1977).
87. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated Learned Hand
Formula 52 La. L. Rev. 323 (1991); cf. Kelly, supra note 27, at 103-04.
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point where that investment ceases to produce further net accident
avoidance (P x L). That is the point where the marginal benefit from
the last unit invested in accident avoidance equals the marginal cost of
that last unit. After that point, accident avoidance is too expensive; one
dollar invested in accident avoidance will yield less than one dollar's
worth of accident avoidance, or safety, if you will. That is, tort rules,
to the economist, should encourage people to invest in accident avoidance
up to the point where the marginal benefit derived from the investment
equals the marginal cost of that additional safety. Negligence law then
is part of that invisible "Hand" that assures efficient behavior. That
equilibrium point represents an efficient investment in safety. Therefore,
one is negligent if one could avoid an accident for less than its anticipated
cost: if B < P x L. Note that P x L represents the ex ante, beforehand,
"cost" of the risk. This cost should represent all the costs associated
with the risk although one may justifiably wonder if this is ever the
case in the real world.88 Ideally P x L plus some amount for admin-
istration and profits ought to equal the pre-accident premium one would
pay for insurance to avoid the risk.
How does the Learned Hand formula affect the traditional negligence
formula? It consumes it. First, let's examine what it leaves. It probably
leaves cause-in-fact. The plaintiff must still show that but for the de-
fendant's failure to invest in safety, i.e., behave reasonably, the accident
would not have happened. There is no economic reason, as I see it,
even to leave this element, but most seem to still pay it lip service even
if using Hand's formula. What about duty? Well one has a duty to
protect against those risks for which B < P x L, and no others. What
about breach? One has breached a duty to exercise ordinary (efficient?)
care if B < P x L, and not otherwise. How about proximate cause?
One is responsible for those risks for which B < P x L, and presumably
not others. That is, one is responsible for those risks that made him
negligent in the first place, and no others. Those risks, per the formula,
are the risks that could have been efficiently avoided beforehand. I
believe this is what the court meant in Wagon Mound IP9 when it said:
It does not follow that, no matter what the circumstances may
be, it is justifiable to neglect a risk of small magnitude. A
reasonable man would only neglect such a risk if he had some
valid reason for doing so; e.g., that it would involve considerable
expense to eliminate the risk. 9°
Likewise, one sees an obvious corollary in Judge Keeton's formu-
lation that one is liable for "that harm, and only that harm, of which
88. See id.
89. Privy Council, 1966 [1967] 1 A.C. 617.
90. Id. at 618-19.
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the negligent aspect of his conduct is a cause in fact." 9' Finally, the
Hand formula is consistent with Justice Dennis' statement in Pitre v.
Opelousas General Hospital92 of the scope of the liability of a "good
faith" tortfeasor. He stated: "the same criterion of foreseeability and
risk of harm which determined whether a physician in this kind of
situation was negligent in the first instance should determine the extent
of his liability for that negligence . . . -93 And damages, how do they
fit in under the Hand formula? I assume that under the Hand formula
the defendant pays those damages that made him negligent in the first
place-L.
Some courts seemingly only employ the Hand formula to determine
whether there has been a breach of the duty to exercise reasonable
care.94 However, in so doing they usually ask the duty question very
broadly: does the defendant have a duty to exercise reasonable care to
avoid a foreseeable risk? No matter, it should be seen that the Hand
formula can basically swallow up the traditional negligence formula.
One might wonder whether that is so unique or so bad. For now, let
us ask whether the judge or jury should apply the formula. The practice
is, I believe, that the fact-finders do the job. Certainly if the formula
is primarily used to determine breach and breach is a traditional question
for the fact-finder, the jury ought to apply the Hand formula.
If it is the jury's job to apply the formula, has the formula taken
the trial judge out of the negligence business except in cases tried to
the court,. or, in jury cases, where the judge must decide whether to
grant directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOVs)? If so where does policy fit in? And, as a matter of policy,
do we want juries, untrained in economic concepts, to be making ec-
onomic decisions?95 Aren't judges better able to make these types of
decisions and engage in these types of balancing processes, especially in
the growing number of complex technological tort cases courts are faced
with?96 These cases do not involve the same old reasonable person we
used to talk about.
However, if we let judges "Do the Hand" have we taken juries
out of the negligence business, except to decide cause-in-fact and maybe
a question of pure fact now and then? If so, there are surely shades
91. Robert Keeton, Legal Cause in the Law of Torts 9 (1963).
92. 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).
93. Id. at 1161.
94. See, e.g., Levi v. S.W. La. Elec. Membership Co-op, 542 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1989).
95. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from
the Rule of Law, 51 Ind. L.J. 467, 468-82 (1976), reprinted in Robert L. Rabin, Perspectives




of Holmes idea of the rule of law in negligence cases at work again. 97
That is certainly the result if we entrust the Hand formula to the judge,
as opposed to the jury. How would duty-risk incorporate the Hand
formula? Again, I think the question is backwards. How would the
Hand formula incorporate duty-risk? It would, as it does with the
traditional formula, eat it up.
In conclusion let me chart again, assuming for now that the jury
is the entity applying the Hand formula.
Traditional Formula Who Decides? Hand Formula
Duty Judge/Jury B < P x L
Breach Jury/Jury B < P x L
CIF Jury/Jury CIF
PC Jury/Jury B < P x L
Damages Jury/Jury L
E. Summary
Under the traditional negligence formula, the violation of statute
approach, and the duty-risk approach, the same questions are being
asked. The only thing that is really different is who gets to do the
answering. At common law, the jury gets to decide the proximate cause
element and the breach element. Under the violation of statute approach,
the court decides proximate cause when it decides whether the statute
was intended, or designed, to protect against the risk that occurred in
the case before it. Interestingly, even under the violation of statute
approach some courts still insist upon asking the jury about proximate
cause. Likewise, depending upon the procedural effect the relevant ju-
risdiction accords violation of a statute, the jury may still have some
role to play in determining the scope of the statute's protection. Likewise,
in a violation of statute case, the court, rather than the jury, sets the
standard of care although, once again, depending upon the procedural
effect of violation of statute the jury may still retain some power here
as well.
Turning to the duty-risk approach, the judge has the power to make
the risk, or legal limitation (proximate cause) decision. The jury seems
to retain its power to define the standard of care although the court's
statement of duty may even play some role here. Finally, the Learned
Hand formula may give the jury great power, while collapsing the
negligence question into essentially one issue: is B < P x L? However,
the formula is a synthesis of common law jurisprudence, so it cannot
be considered a total deviation from the three other approaches.
97. See Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 48 S. Ct. 24 (1927).
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So where does it all leave us? What have we learned about the
various approaches to negligence? Perhaps like a rose, negligence by
any other name, is still negligence.

